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ABSTRACT
Political Violence and Unemployment: Socio-Economic Strain as a Potential Source of
Terrorism
Reinmar Freis-Beattie
Why do some people commit acts of violence which are politically or ideologically
motivated? Furthermore, why does the United States see such great variation in the number of
terrorist incidents from year to year? To help answer these questions, Robert Agnew’s (2010)
General Strain Theory of Terrorism lays out a foundational model to explain what might cause
terrorism. In contrast to previous strain theories, General Strain Theory of Terrorism argues that
the strains most likely to result in terrorism are collective strains which are (a) high in
magnitude, with civilians affected; (b) perceived as unjust; and (c) inflicted by more powerful
‘others’. Collective strains affect groups or entire societies, rather than specific individuals.
Collective strains increase negative emotions and attitudes, radicalize groups and individuals,
contribute to a collective orientation and response, and facilitate the social learning of terrorism,
while also reducing social control and access to legal coping means.
To test this theory, I argue that economic strains constitute collective strains. From this
point I tested a portion of GST, focusing my analysis within the US, and examining the conduit
from economic strain to increasing negative emotions to domestic terrorism using a path analysis
of macro-level data collected from public sources. The analysis showed moderate support for
theoretical assumptions. Some macroeconomic indicators such as unemployment can lead to
domestic terrorism, while others such as poverty do not. As unemployment in the US rises, so do
negative emotions and attitudes, and through this, incidents of domestic terrorism. Of course,
economic factors are only one possible source of strain, and negative emotions are only one
mediator in Agnew’s model. From this we can conclude that General Strain Theory of Terrorism
may be a worthwhile avenue for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
Although it started out like any other Wednesday, April 19, 1995 would soon become one
of the most tragic days in American history. On that fateful day at 9:00am Central Time a
massive explosion from a 4,800 pound bomb inside a Ryder truck ripped through the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and wounding almost 700 more
(Sofer 2012). The explosion was so massive that it damaged buildings within a 16 block radius,
and until the attacks of September 11th, 2001, was the most violent terrorist incident to ever
strike US soil. The attacker, Timothy McVeigh, was a white supremacist who believed that the
Federal government was attacking the civil liberties of people like him and that a race war was
on the horizon. Oklahoma City was certainly the most dramatic event of domestic terrorism in
the United States, but tragic events like this occur more often than we would care to admit, and
there never seems to be a consensus as to the rhyme or reason.
Every year, acts of violence occur in the United States which are distinct from traditional
crimes. Acts of terrorism such as these are broadly defined as politically and socially motivated
acts of violence which frequently target civilians or symbols of the US government. In recent
decades, and especially since the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a hotbutton issue in world politics and the results affect our daily lives. Though catastrophic events
such as 9/11 or the Oklahoma City bombing stand out most in the media, in reality terrorism is
much closer than we realize, often occurring as small-scale events orchestrated and carried out
by US citizens. The bigger terrorist threat to the United States comes from within, rather than
from an external aggressor. According to the FBI, between 1980-2001 about two-thirds of all
terrorist plots were classified as “domestic”, and that figure rose to 95% between 2002 and 2005
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(FBI 2005). Understanding and solving the social problems of terrorism and political violence
has become a top priority of both governments and scholars.
While the root causes of terrorism are controversially debated, one of the more popular ideas
suggests that socio-economic strain may be a contributing factor. An unclassified Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) report from April 2009 predicted an increase in domestic terrorism
citing the economic climate, high unemployment, mortgage foreclosures, and many returning
military veterans as likely influences. This report draws many of its conclusions based on
perceived similarities to the years leading up to the Oklahoma City bombing (DHS 2009).
The goal of this research is to evaluate the validity of the relationship between economic
strain and terrorism. Some scholars conceptualize strain as pressure or stress exerted on an
individual from an external force, which provoke individuals to engage in certain deviant
behaviors (Agnew 1938). Robert Agnew (1992) described strain as “relationships where others
are not treating the individual as he or she would like to be treated (p.48).” Within this definition,
strain can be interpreted as an event, an interpretation of stimuli, and emotional responses. In
terrorism research, strain is frequently used synonymously with ‘grievances’ (Agnew 2010).
Economic strain is, therefore, strain or grievances which result from economic conditions or
forces.
Specifically, I examine this relationship under the framework of Agnew’s General Strain
Theory of Terrorism (2010). Agnew’s theory focuses on how collective strains influence terrorist
type behaviors, laying out the specific conditions or “paths” that lead to terrorism, such as
radicalization, reduced social control, and increased negative emotions. Testing all the possible
“paths” to terrorism is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I focus specifically on the role of
negative emotions and attitudes and in connection to economic strains to subsequent terrorist
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acts. I utilize data from the Global Terrorism Database, Stimson’s Public Mood Variable,
Gallup’s Most Important Problem, the US Census Bureau, and Bureau of Labor Statistics to
assess the validity of a path model connecting economic strain, negative emotion, and terrorism.
Though many scholars have theorized about the possible causes of terrorism (Black 2004,
Ehrlich and Liu 2002, Pape 2005, Sageman 2004, Schinkel 2009), currently there is little
consensus among empirical studies evaluating the validity of theoretical work. Regarding the
principles Robert Agnew’s theory, the literature is divided in its attempts to evaluate these ideas,
with some studies finding a relationship, and others unable to reveal any significant connection
between economic deprivation and terrorism. At minimum, this study will attempt to add to the
current body of research, by empirically evaluating a specific theoretical perspective.
On a more practical side, since terrorism and political violence are real-world problems
taken seriously by policy makers, it is essential that the root causes are examined as closely as
possible, as many anti-terrorism policies affect our daily lives. In the seemingly unending period
of economic strain in which the US and much of the rest of the world is experiencing, it is also
pertinent to evaluate whether or not we can predict if levels of politically motivated violence will
rise. Since the onset of the economic recession in 2008, the political climate in the US has
steadily become more polarized and hostile. As unemployment has risen so have tempers, and
the more radical voices in our system have moved themselves to center stage (Przybyla 2011). If
the hypotheses presented in this research are correct, then policy makers should consider
combatting economic strain to be of paramount importance in reducing and preventing political
violence and terrorism within the United States.
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THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
The terrorism literature is a huge body of both theoretical and empirical research which is
growing rapidly. Searching Google Scholar for the word “terrorism” currently returns over
700,000 academic sources. However, the current body of research is divided regarding the
possible root causes of terrorism and politically motivated violence. In this section, I attempt to
address some of the prevalent ideas and prominent studies upon which this research is built.
Theories of Terrorism
Explanations of terrorism are as wide reaching as the social sciences will allow. Perspectives
from every discipline exist, whether psychological, political, economic, or sociological. Some of
the prominent and relative perspectives are discussed below.
An Identity Theory approach explaining religiously and ethnically motivated terrorism
asserts that the interaction between cultural identity, social identity, and personal identity can be
deterministic in whether an individual participates in terrorist activity (Schwartz, Dunkel, and
Waterman, 2009). This approach focuses on terrorism more as a cultural phenomenon, namely
when religious or ethnic groups such as Al Qaeda, the PLO, Chechen Rebels, and IRA engage in
terrorist activities. However these ideas do not effectively explain cases of domestic terrorism in
the United States. A similar, though more relevant theoretical approach, hypothesizes that group
radicalization is a mechanism which can lead to terrorism (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008).
Under this pretense, terrorism is the outcome of a process of inter-group conflict.
The logic of framing terrorism through rational choice has been argued by multiple authors
(Caplan 2006; Turk 2004). The rational choice model argues that terrorism is not a haphazard or
indiscriminate phenomenon, but rather one of many means to a social or political end, and with
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potential risks and gains strategically calculated. In this framework terrorism is seen as a political
act, used similarly to protests, voting behavior, and even warfare.
However, other scholars feel that the rational choice model, used primarily by political
scientists and economists, is too narrow and simplistic (Schinkel 2004). Instead, this counterargument posits that the social and historical context of terrorism is more important to
understanding the problem. Rationalism in this sense is better defined through the group rather
than the individual, where the group seeks to maximize the effect of limited resources for social
or political gain (Schinkel 2004). Essentially, when these perspectives are taken together,
terrorism is not a random act, but one that is employed to achieve a goal. Therefore it should be
at least somewhat predictable.
These perspectives are focused primarily on the choice of terrorism as a method to address
grievances or accomplish a goal. Rather than evaluate the factors which shape the choice to
employ one tactic over another, I instead seek to evaluate variables which shape the impetus of
terrorism. What are the root causes which influence groups and individuals to become violent in
the first place? To examine this aspect of terrorism, I turn to another school of thought that
focuses on the role of structural variables and how such forces may “push” individuals and
groups to turn to violence. This type of theoretical framework posits that political violence and
terrorism in particular, are the result of broader socio-economic trends (Ehrlich and Liu 2002).
Within this perspective, Social Strain Theory, which has its roots in Merton’s Anomie Theory
(1938) and later updated by Agnew’s General Strain Theory (1992), offers an explanation of
terrorism in the United States.
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Social Strain Theories and Terrorism
Originating in the structuralist perspective and continuing in the tradition of Durkheim
(1895), strain theory approaches have traditionally been used by criminologists to explore the
link between deviance and socio-economic disadvantage (Cohen 1965). The main principle in
strain theory and its sub-theories is that structural, socio-economic factors put strain on
individuals which “pushes” them into deviance (Merton 1938). Merton’s Anomie Theory
focused on the influence of roles, class, and cultural factors along with structural conditions, on
individual deviance. Merton theorized that failure to achieve specified social goals, such as the
acquisition of material wealth and status, produces strain on individuals. In order to cope with
strain, individuals use legitimate or illegitimate means to accomplish these social objectives, or
abandon these goals, or both in five different coping strategies: conformity, innovation, ritualism,
retreatism, and rebellion.
Despite its popularity, Anomie Theory is not without its weaknesses. The primary
shortcoming of the theory is that it focuses primarily on the acquisition of material wealth as the
social goal. This approach fails to explain non-utilitarian, ideological, or malicious crimes which
do not result in material gain (Cohen 1997). To address the problems with Merton’s original
idea, Agnew re-focused strain theory and asserted that strain could come from many places,
focusing instead on norms, emotions, and the individual’s immediate social environment (1992).
Agnew’s General Strain Theory differs from Merton in a few key ways. Metron’s Anomie
Theory focuses on macro-level forces, while Agnew’s theory focuses more on micro- level
forces of social learning and immediate social environments. This refocusing and individualizing
of strain from the macro- to micro-level is the primary contribution of General Strain Theory to
the strain literature. In addition, Anomie Theory does not adequately address the role of emotion
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in crime (Agnew 1992; Cohen 1965), which Agnew sought to rectify with General Strain
Theory, arguing that structure and the social environment pressure individuals to commit deviant
acts with emotions as their primary mediator (Agnew 1992).
The same ideas about structure, strain, and social environment can be applied to terrorism,
from the point of view that terrorism is a response to social and political grievances. The strain
produced by structural and environmental factors pushes individuals and groups towards
violence. These views have become popular enough that Agnew himself has proposed a
“General Strain Theory of Terrorism” (GST) which offers a customized version of strain theory
specifically for terrorism. The key difference between GST and other strain-based theories is that
GST focuses on “collective strains”, whereas other approaches focus on strains as perceived by
individuals (Agnew 2010). In other words, in previous theories strain was conceptualized as
something that is felt only by individuals (Merton 1938; Agnew 1992), GST emphasizes strain as
something felt by groups, and societies as a whole, in addition to the strain felt by individuals
(Agnew 2010). This idea of collective experience of strain is central to how strain can translate
into terrorism under the GST framework. With GST, these ideas of structure, social control, and
social environment are applicable to both the micro- and macro-levels, and encompass a much
broader scope than either Anomie Theory or General Strain Theory, while staying focused on a
particular social phenomena.
According to Agnew collective strains must be, “(a) high in magnitude, with civilians
affected; (b) perceived as unjust; and (c) inflicted by significantly more powerful others,
including ‘complicit’ civilians, with whom members of the strained collectivity have weak ties.
(2010: 136)” He also argues that the likelihood of terrorism is amplified by these collective
strains via increasing negative emotions, decreasing social control, diminishing ability to cope
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through legal means, the cultivation of the social learning of terrorism, and a contribution to a
collective emphasis and reaction. In other words, the link between the source of the collective
strain and terrorism is not a direct one but, rather it follows one or more indirect paths. In this
model, strain is transferred to groups and individuals via the various paths, similar to how a
Newton’s cradle transfers energy across several spheres while only visibly affecting the ends.
According to GST, terrorism can occur through any of the paths, however the likelihood of
terrorism increases as multiple paths are engaged (Agnew 2010).
Under Agnew’s model (2010), collective strains affect a group or entire society. As such,
individuals experience the strain as it is diffused through the collective, meaning that although
their lives may only be indirectly connected to or displaced by the strain, the effects are still felt
as very real, even if only vicariously. Societal level strains still create a sense of fear, worry,
anger, and frustration in individuals. For example, one must not become unemployed to be
fearful, angry, or frustrated about a rise in unemployment. Seeing those around you experience
strain, or hearing daily accounts of the effects of strain which exists on the collective level is
enough to evoke these feelings in individuals.
GST also postulates that not all strains are felt in the same way, and that very few people
respond to strain with violence. Individuals and groups experience radicalization, increased
negative emotions, and a collective emphasis and reaction. At the same time, collective strains
reduce social control, reduce legal coping means, and facilitate the social learning of terrorism.
This particular mix of forces is, according to Agnew, most likely to result in terrorism (2010).
Figure 1 plots the various paths to terrorism from collective strain in Agnew’s GST model.
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Figure 1: Visual Conception of Agnew’s (2010) General Strain Theory of Terrorism
Radicalization
Increased Bad Emotions

Collective
Strain

Reduced Social Control

Terrorism
Reduced Legal Coping Means
Social Learning of Terrorism
Collective emphasis/ reaction

Economic Conditions as Collective Strains
In any empirical research, one of the biggest problems is translating abstract, theoretical
concepts into concrete, operational variables that can be directly measured and tested. While the
idea of collective strains is rather simple in itself, much of the work of operationalization has
been left up to the researcher to define what constitutes a “collective strain.” In addition, the task
of operationalization also involves asking which collective strains are likely to result in
terrorism. Furthermore, as of the final draft of this paper, no previous research exists that
empirically evaluates GST. This lack of previous research exacerbates the challenge of
operationalization of the model’s key constructions but make the current research the first
attempt to assess the validity and accuracy of Agnew’s GST model (2010).
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In this paper I argue that economic strains, specifically those resulting from macroeconomic
forces, constitute collective strains as defined by Agnew’s criteria (2010). The economic
atmosphere since 2008 is (a.) high in magnitude, affecting the entire country; (b.) perceived as
unjust, especially with mass unemployment (Sanders, 2012); and (c.) inflicted by significantly
more powerful “others”, such as the Federal Government and Wall Street as well as specific
politicians and bankers who, arguably, have weak ties to the collective (Gibbs 2009). From this
perspective, I assert that economic strain produced from structural forces such as a bad economy
and high unemployment affect attitudes at the group and individual levels. Individuals and
groups affected are then affected through one or more of Agnew’s “paths to terrorism” thereby
increasing the likelihood of domestic political violence.
Although this research is the first to investigate the relationship between economic variables
and terrorism under Agnew’s GST framework, it is not the first to explore this connection
between economic factors and terrorist acts. But these studies often yield contradictory results.
Generally, studies of the relationship between economic variables and violence, including
terrorism, use a frustration-aggression approach. Studies in this vein which focus on economic
factors such as relative deprivation have been used to explain rebellions in the past (Gurr 1970).
This approach, and others emphasizing the role of grievances, echoes many of the ideas found in
the contemporary strain based approach to politically motivated violence.
For instance, Weeber and Rodahever (2003) used a content analysis of US militia movement
web forum posts to determine whether social or economic strain was a precipitating factor in
their membership rates. Their findings support the principles of Smesler’s Theory of Collective
Behavior, an earlier strain-based approach, and revealed that the majority of militia members
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experienced socio-economic strain before or during their membership (Weeber and Rodeheaver
2003).
A study by Burgoon (2006) argues that social welfare policies reduce incidents of
international and domestic terrorism. The research hypothesizes that social welfare policies
diminish support for terrorism by reducing contributing factors such as poverty, inequality,
economic insecurity, and religious-political extremism, and that countries with higher social
welfare spending will experience fewer domestic terrorist attacks and fewer of their citizens
participate in terrorism as a result of this decrease in socio-economic strain. These hypotheses
were supported by a regression analysis that examined terrorism and social welfare spending on
a global scale with the country as the unit of analysis (Burgoon, 2006).
Another relevant article in support of the link between socio-economic factors and terrorism
hypothesizes that countries with higher levels of minority discrimination will experience more
incidents of domestic terrorism, and that more developed countries will experience lower levels
of domestic terrorism (Piazza 2011). This study found that minority economic discrimination and
general economic conditions were significant predictors of levels of domestic terrorism using a
regression analysis (Piazza 2011). However, an earlier study by Piazza performed a crossnational analysis, but did not reveal any relationship between economic indicators and terrorism
(Piazza 2006).
Another study using public opinion polls from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to analyze
attitudes in support of terrorism did not find a reduction in support of terrorism among those with
greater socio-economic resources (Krueger and Malekova, 2003). Krueger and Malekova (2003)
also looked at Hezbollah’s terrorist activities in Lebanon during the 1980s and 90s. This analysis
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did not reveal an empirical relationship between either economic factors or education and
participation in terrorism.
Clearly, there is some contention as to what role economic strain plays in influencing
terrorism and how influential it is. My project seeks to add this small but important piece to the
literature on terrorism and economic strain in two ways: (1), empirically evaluating a portion of
GST and (2) addressing some of the limitations in previous empirical research. Many of the
studies also examined terrorism on a global level rather than within a specific country, which I
believe weakens their results by failing to account for differences in social, political, and
economic factors which vary greatly between countries. It is possible that economics may be a
more powerful force of stain in some societies and irrelevant to terrorism in others. Also, most of
these studies do not examine data over time but merely look at a snapshot of terrorist data. Since
terrorism is a highly dynamic phenomenon, with levels of violence varying greatly from year to
year and between regions, I believe that an approach which accounts for changes over time is
necessary to explain how dynamic social, political, and economic forces can affect terrorism.
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METHODOLOGY
In this study, I perform a limited test of Agnew’s GST model, focusing on how economic
strains act as collective strains and affect negative emotions and attitudes, which in turn lead to
acts of domestic terrorism. The rationale for this is twofold: First, as a relatively new theoretical
model which is broad in scope, this paper takes a first step by evaluating GST by looking at a
singular path to terrorism from collective strain. Second, a limited test will give an idea as to
whether further and fuller tests of GST are worthwhile avenues to pursue with a larger. Since the
theory is so broad, testing its individual parts is a logical first step.
While economic strains constitute the collective strain portion of this model, a key aspect to
the GST paradigm is the role of intervening or amplifying conditions that lead from collective
strains to terrorism. For this research I explore the pathway through negative emotions such as
fear, anger, and frustration to terrorism. Due to the emphasis of the broader strain theory
literature on the importance of emotions (Agnew 1992, 2010), I feel that this is an appropriate
place to start when testing GST. In addition, research into emotion and political collective action
has found that anger, contempt, and efficacy play a large role in participation (Van Zomeren et
al. 2004) in contentious behavior. At this point, not much research has closely examined the role
of emotions in terrorism; however there is a clear case that this is a worthwhile avenue of inquiry
(Rice 2009). It is also important to note that while this study focuses on the impact of
macroeconomic forces, strain can originate from any number of sources, and GST is a theory
about how people react to the strains which they experience (Agnew 2010). Figure 2 illustrates
the relevant path of GST that will be examined here.
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Figure 2: Assessed Path of Agnew’s (2010) General Strain Theory of Terrorism
Macroeconomic
Strain

Negative Attitudes of
Macroeconomics

Terrorism

The theoretical pathway in Figure 2 translates into the following GST hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Increasing socio-economic strain will increase the level of negative
emotions and attitudes in the United States.

Hypothesis 2: Increasing negative emotions and attitudes will lead to increased rates of
domestic terrorist attacks in the United States.

Data and Measures
This study utilizes secondary data analysis and examines data over time to evaluate the
effect of dynamic change in socioeconomic factors on terrorist incidents. The unit of analysis is
the nation-year, i.e. separate data for each variable organized by year (e.g. 1990, 1991, 1992,
etc.). Since the root causes of terrorism and political violence have not yet proven to be
generalizable across cultures, this model will have the most validity within the United States.
Testing the relationship between economic strain, negative emotions and attitudes, and
terrorism in the United States is not a simple undertaking. Firstly, both strain and negative
emotions and attitudes are latent variables. They are not directly measured, but rather constructed
from different proxy measures. Secondly, since the link between collective strain and terrorism is
not direct, a regression analysis is not sufficient to test the relationship. This project will
therefore use a path analysis, a more appropriate method for testing Agnew’s model. Primary
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hypotheses are derived from GST, and secondary hypotheses are derived from the individual
measures used.
Terrorism
Terrorism is a controversial issue, and each agency, think tank, and group of scholars has
their own unique definitional criteria. These are mostly similar definitions which are all equally
vague in their parameters. Debating this however, is not the purpose of this research. For the
purpose of this study, I rely on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) definitional criteria for
terrorism. It is a widely cited database, and considered by many to be the best source on
terrorism in the United States.
The GTD defines terrorism as “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence
by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear,
coercion, or intimidation.” Within this blanket definition, the GTD also specifies that the act
must be intentional, must involve some level of violence or threat of violence against persons or
property, and that perpetrators must be sub-national actors (GTD Codebook). In addition, the
GTD includes three criteria which can be required or not, allowing for researchers to specify the
strictness of their definitions:
1. The act must be aimed at pursuing political, economic, religious, or social goal.
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some message to
a larger audience than the immediate victims.
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.
For this research, data was collected requiring all three criteria to be met for inclusion, giving
us the strictest possible definition within the dataset. Incidents can also be filtered on many
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categories, such as geographic location, attack type, perpetrators, casualties, etc. and can be
filtered on three specific definitional criteria, with unsuccessful attacks ambiguous cases either
included or excluded. In addition, one further definitional criterion can be accounted for in the
GTD: whether or not a sufficient doubt exists as to whether or not the event was exclusively
terrorism. Many incidents of terrorism fall into a grey area with hate crime, insurgency,
organized crime, and other crimes. This can be filtered out with the GTD’s “Doubt Terrorism
Proper” filter in the advanced search. This was also required in this research to filter ambiguous
cases. Unsuccessful attacks were included as well, since the purpose of the project is to assess
the likelihood that individuals or groups will use terrorism, not how successful they are.
This project also limits the number of terrorist incidents to those which fall into the
classification of “Domestic” or “Homegrown” terror (Whitaker 2001), i.e. those committed by
individuals who are US citizens either de jure or de facto. Definitional criteria for domestic or
homegrown acts of terror were sourced from the FBI: “Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or
threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within
the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property
to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in
furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI 2005). Data was filtered to exclude incidents
which did not meet either “domestic” or “homegrown” criteria. To be included in the analysis,
groups must be based in the United States, and conduct their operations within the United States
territory. Filtering was made on group affiliation, individuals and unknown perpetrators were
included. A list of included and excluded groups is found in Appendix A.
In my analysis, the actual measure of terrorism used as the dependent variable is the total
number of terrorist incidents committed and attempted within the United States by year, filtered
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using the aforementioned criteria. Recall that the goal is of course to assess the likelihood that
individuals or groups turn to terrorism, not necessarily if they were successful. Once a count was
made, years 1970 and 1971 were excluded as outliers, and 1993 is incomplete and counted as
missing from the dataset, leaving 39 nation years for analysis.
Independent Variables: Economic Strain
My main independent variable of interest is economic strain, which I’ve chosen to
measure with two indicators: unemployment rate, and poverty rate. I am primarily interested in
the effect of the unemployment rate. Since unemployment is a highly dynamic force which rises
and falls regularly, often translating into sudden shifts in socio-economic status for millions of
individuals, I believe that it is most likely to create strain conditions which could result in
terrorism. The unemployment rate is a measure of persons actively seeking gainful employment
as a percentage of all workers in the United States. As defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
“Persons are classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in
the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work. Persons who were not working and were
waiting to be recalled to a job from which they had been temporarily laid off are also included as
unemployed. Receiving benefits from the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program has no bearing
on whether a person is classified as unemployed1.”
If socio-economic strain is a contributing factor to political violence, then unemployment
should be a powerful predictor of terrorism in the United States. Unemployment is often a
quickly changing force which has the potential to suddenly displace large numbers of people.
Following from the frustration-aggression literature, these sudden drop offs in employment and
1

Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2013. “Labor Force Characteristics.” US Department of Labor
http://www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm#unemp
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socioeconomic status are most likely to result in relative deprivation effects, which have shown
to be a source of grievances in many political rebellions (Gurr 1970). This data was gathered
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which allows public access of unemployment data specified
by month and year.
Information on the yearly poverty rate is freely available from the Census Bureau. The
poverty rate is calculated as a percentage of the population living under the legally defined
poverty line by income2. Poverty is a likely source of strain for individuals, and the poverty rate
is a dynamic variable. As Nathaniel Hawthorne once said, “Families are always rising and falling
in America.” Impoverished groups and individuals are likely to feel strains associated with their
situations.
Intervening Variables: Negative Emotions and Attitudes
Agnew’s model also specifies the importance of intervening variables, or variables which
amplify the various “paths” to terrorism as outlined in his theory. Agnew outlines several ways
that strain can lead to terrorism, such as increasing bad emotions, radicalization, reduced social
control, diminished legal coping means, the social learning of terrorism, and orienting a
population to a collective response (Agnew 2010). While testing all of these paths would be
ideal, it is beyond the scope of this project. Instead, I focus on one which is particularly
interesting to social psychologists: how negative emotions can lead to terrorism in the presence
of strain. Negative emotions are also a latent construct, and since there is no direct measure, I
again use proxies to gauge the extent of negative attitudes and emotions, particularly as they
relate to economic conditions in the United States.

2

More information about poverty rate statistics is available from the US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/
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The first measure is from the Public Mood dataset, compiled by James Stimson3. The
dataset aggregates public opinion surveys from 1952 until 2011 on a number of different topics
and subtopics. For this analysis, I isolate the measure of public mood regarding macroeconomics,
which I feel is most appropriate for assessing the relationship between economic mood and
strain. Questions asked in the macroeconomic topic areas are typically based on a Likert Scale of
strongly agree to agree or disagree to strongly disagree and cover a range of economic issues.
Some sample questions asked include:
“Are you in favor of or against less government regulation of business?”
“Are you in favor of or against government financing of projects to create new jobs?”
“The government ought to see to it that every person who wants work has a job. Agree or
disagree?”
“Do you feel rich people are asked to pay more than they should in federal income taxes, about
the right amount, or less than they should?”
“I the government had to choose between keeping down inflation or keeping down
unemployment, to which do you think it should give the highest priority?”

Public mood is measured on a scale of 1-100, with higher numbers associated with more
liberalism, i.e. desire for more government involvement, openness to more spending (Stimson
2012). While this is a roundabout proxy measure, based on evidence from psychological
research, we can expect that lower values or more conservative moods are associated with more
negative emotions such as more resistance to change, and more extreme response to threats than
higher or more liberalistic moods (Jost and Amodio 2011; Thorisdottir et al. 2007).
The second intervening variable used is Gallup’s Most Important Problem, a collection
of public opinion polls which assess the topic areas which are most important to Americans. The
3

More information on Public Mood Data available from the Policy Agendas Project
http://www.policyagendas.org/
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topic areas in the surveys are based on the topic areas used in the Public Moods dataset, and
assess what percentage of people think that a given topic is the most important problem at the
time. Once again, we used the Macroeconomic topic for our analysis. It is reasonable to think
that when more people feel that macroeconomics is the most important problem that they
experience more negative emotions, such as worry, fear, or anger, in relation to that topic. This
variable is recorded as the percentage of respondents who feel that macroeconomic issues are the
most important and pressing problems of the day.
Operationalized Hypotheses
Now that the dependent, independent, and intervening variables have been
operationalized to measure terrorism, collective (economic) strain, and negative emotions and
attitudes, respectively, I restate my hypotheses using these specific variables:
Hypothesis 1a: As the unemployment rate increases, macroeconomic public mood will decrease
(i.e. become more negative).
Hypothesis 1b: As the unemployment rate increases, the percentage of Americans that view
macroeconomics as the most important problem will increase.
Hypothesis 1c: As the poverty rate increases, macroeconomic public mood will decrease (i.e.
become more negative).
Hypothesis 1d: As the poverty rate increases, the percentage of Americans that view
macroeconomics as the most important problem will increase.

Hypothesis 2a: As macroeconomic public mood decreases (i.e. becomes more negative), the
number of domestic terrorist attacks will increase.
Hypothesis 2b: As the percentage of Americans who view macroeconomic issues as the most
important problem increases, the number of domestic terrorist attacks will increase.

21

Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 lists basic descriptive information for the dependent, independent, and
intervening variables used in the analysis. Figures 4 through 6 plot the change in the variables
over the time period under analysis in this research (1972-2011, omitting 1993). From 1972 to
2011, the United States experienced an average of 32.5 incidents of domestic terrorism, with the
largest year experiencing 112 incidents, and the lowest experiencing only 1. Looking at
economic indicators, unemployment averages 6.93% over the same period, ranging from 4.0% to
9.7%, the poverty rate has an average of 13.1%, with a range of 11.1% to 15.2%. As far as
emotions and attitude measures go, Public Mood averages a score of 59.08, ranging from 51.9 to
66.9, and Macroeconomics as the Most Important Problem has an average of 38.62%, ranging
between 11.45% and 78.78% from 1972 to 2011. Looking at the variables graphed over time, we
can see that they are dynamic phenomenon which can fluctuate greatly over time. Some do so
more than others, for instance, terrorism and Most Important Problem have a large range of
values, while unemployment, poverty, and public mood have more moderate variation.
Terrorism peaks in the 1970s and 1980s, and has steadily declined from the late 1990s to the
present.

22

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Terrorism

32.53

24.52

1

112

Unemployment

6.39

1.57

4.0

9.7

Poverty

13.1

1.23

11.1

15.2

Public Mood

59.08

3.78

51.9

66.9

Most Important Problem

38.62

16.98

11.45

78.78

Figure 3. Domestic Terrorist Incidents in the US
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Figure 4. Economic Strain Variables
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Figure 5. Emotions and Attitudes Variables
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RESULTS
Testing the relationship between economic strain, negative emotions and attitudes, and
terrorism in the United States is not a simple undertaking. First, both strain and negative attitudes
are latent variables. They are not directly measured, but rather constructed from different proxy
measures. Second, since the link between collective strains and terrorism is not direct, a standard
regression analysis is not sufficient to test the relationship. My analyses will therefore use path
analysis, a more appropriate method for testing Agnew’s model. Path analysis allows for
sequential “paths” from variable to variable, mimicking the structure of the GST model in Figure
1, and the proposed path under assessment here, as previously outlined in Figure 2.
First, I examine the bivariate correlation coefficients between variables, displayed in
Table 2 below. As we can see, unemployment is not correlated with Public Mood at -0.003, but
has a very strong correlation with Most Important Problem at 0.819. Poverty exhibits low
correlation with Public Mood at 0.197 and low-moderate correlation with Most Important
Problem at 0.364. Then, Public Mood has a moderate correlation with terrorism at -0.536, while
Most Important Problem has low-moderate correlation with terrorism at 0.377. These
relationships are expended upon in a path analysis.
Table 2. Bivariate Correlation Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Mood

Problem

Terror

Independent Variable
Unemployment
Poverty
Public Mood
Most Important Problem

-0.003

0.819

0.197

0.364
-0.536
0.377
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The results of the path analysis on the link between economic strain, negative emotions,
and terrorist incidents are presented in Table 3. As expected, unemployment and most important
problem have a significant, positive relationship. As unemployment rises, more people consider
macroeconomics to be the most important problem. This supports Hypothesis 1b. In contrast,
Hypothesis 1d is not supported. While the predicted relationship between poverty and the most
important problem variable was positive, the path analysis finds a negative, but statistically
significant relationship. Essentially, as the poverty rate increases, the percentage of Americans
who view macroeconomic issues as the most important issue decreases, which is the opposite of
what was theoretically predicted. Macroeconomic public mood is not affected by changes in
unemployment, though it is significantly affected by changes in the poverty rate. However, the
positive relationship suggests that as poverty rises, public moods towards macroeconomic factors
become more liberalistic, meaning that negative emotions and attitudes actually decline. These
relationships for the public mood variable do not support either Hypothesis 1a or Hypothesis 1c.
In the second stage of the path analysis, we see that macroeconomic mood is a significant
predictor of terrorism in the United States. Specifically, as macroeconomic public mood
decreases- meaning emotions become more negative - incidents of terrorism increase. This is
consistent with Hypothesis 2a. However, the coefficients for poverty → mood and mood →
terrorism go in opposite directions. Most important problem is also statistically significant when
predicting terrorism, though the significance level is not as powerful as mood. Here we can see
that there is some suggestion that when macroeconomic factors become more important, that
terrorism increases. This supports Hypothesis 2b. Figure 7 visually represents the significant
paths from table 3.
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Table 3 – Path Analysis (One-Tailed Hypotheses)
Dependent Variables
Problem

Mood

-4.73***

1.06*

(1.56)

(.49)

11.22***

-.59

(1.19)

(.64)

Terror

Independent Variables
Poverty

Unemployment
.30*
Problem
(.20)
-2.96***
Mood
(.91)

R2

.73

.07

Overall R2

.28
.75

Notes: *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01
N = 39

Figure 6. Path Analysis Model
Unemployment

Macroeconomic
Public Mood

Terrorism
Poverty

Macroeconomics Most
Important Problem
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Ancillary Analyses
An ancillary analysis re-evaluated the path analysis to account for alternate models. First,
the path analysis was tested without the Public Mood variable, as shown in Table 4. The results
showed strong support for Hypothesis 1b, meaning that as unemployment increases, the
percentage of Americans who view macroeconomics as the most important problem increases.
Similarly to the first analysis, Hypothesis 1d was not supported, and even suggests the opposite:
that as the poverty rate increases, the number of Americans who view macroeconomics as the
most important problem decreases. Hypothesis 2b was more strongly supported in this analysis
than in the initial estimation. As the number of Americans who view macroeconomics as the
most important problem increases, the number of terrorist incidents increases.

Table 4. Path Analysis Excluding Public Mood (One-Tailed Hypotheses)
Dependent Variables
Problem

Terror

Independent Variables
Poverty

-4.73***
(1.56)

Unemployment

11.22***
(1.19)

Problem

Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
N = 39

.30***
(.20)
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Due to the still existent confusion of the relationship between poverty, most important
problem, and terrorism, a third analysis was done using path analysis, but excluding poverty and
Public Mood as shown in Table 5. This analysis showed the strongest relationship between
strain, emotions and attitudes, and terrorism. As unemployment increases, the percentage of
Americans who view macroeconomics as the most important problem increases, and as this
increases, so do incidents of domestic terrorism in the United States. This supports Hypotheses
1b and 2b, and the larger theoretical hypothesis much more strongly than previous analyses. Note
that the statistical significance levels for ancillary analyses have dramatically increased as well.

Table 5. Path Analysis Excluding Public Mood and Poverty (One-Tailed Hypotheses)
Dependent Variables
Problem

Terror

Independent Variables
Unemployment

8.83***
(.997)

Problem

Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
N = 39

.539***
(.212)
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A final analysis was performed without any intervening variables and tested economic
strain against terrorism using a regression analysis, shown in Table 6. The results showed that
even without mediators, a statistically significant relationship exists. Unemployment has a strong
positive relationship with terrorism, meaning that as unemployment rises, so do incidents of
domestic terrorism. Similarly to previous models though, poverty has a strong negative
relationship with terrorism in the US. This is the opposite of what was theoretically predicted.
The results of this regression show only moderate support for the economic strain-based
explanation.

Table 6. Regression Analysis without Intervening Variables (One-Tailed Hypotheses)
Variable
Unemployment
Poverty
Constant
R2
Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
N = 39

10.97***
(3.89)
-16.15***
(4.65)
173.29***
(42.65)
.394
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This research set out to empirically evaluate a relatively new theoretical perspective, Robert
Agnew’s General Strain Theory of Terrorism, and to offer a possible explanation of varying
levels of political violence in the United States. GST postulates that collective strains are likely
to result in terrorism through various causal “paths” such as increasing negative emotions,
radicalization, fostering the social learning of terrorism, reducing social control and legitimate
coping means, and creating a collective orientation and response. I then argue that economic
strains act as collective strains, and perform an initial test this model through increasing negative
emotions and attitudes, and examining how they may result in domestic terrorism.
To do this, I performed a secondary data analysis of nation-years in the United States. Data
was collected on macroeconomic indicators from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and on emotions and attitudes towards macroeconomic issues from the public moods
dataset and Gallup’s most important problem survey. Terrorism data was collected from the
Global Terrorism database, and filtered to include only incidents that were considered domestic
terrorism without significant doubt.
A path analysis was performed which found some support for the theoretical model.
Unemployment was a significant predictor of macroeconomics as the most important problem,
but not public mood. Poverty was a significant predictor of public mood and most important
problem, however in the opposite direction of what was expected. Public mood and most
important problem were both significant predictors of the number of terrorist incidents in the
United States, meaning that as emotions and attitudes regarding macroeconomics become more
negative, terrorist incidents increase.
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I draw two conclusions from the path analysis results. First: that there is some support of
Agnew’s GST model, particularly the path from strain through negative emotions to terrorism,
even though the relationships tested are far from perfect. Second: that there are a number of
problems and limitations that may muddle the results. Some of the relationships are actually the
opposite of what was expected theoretically, further confusing the results. The small sample size
may be obscuring potentially significant relationships, which can be improved by simply
conducting another analysis in the future when more datapoints are available. This analysis also
focuses on macro-level factors, and does not account for situational factors, which may be
instrumental in pushing groups and individuals from strain to terrorism.
In addition to this, there may be problems with the latent variables not completely or
accurately capturing what they are being used to measure. The terrorism variable itself has some
issues, namely possible collection problems and changes in criteria. Using data which has been
synthesized from multiple collection periods carries this risk. Data collected consistently from
the same researchers or organization with the same criteria may yield different results. There are
also other ways of measuring terrorism rather than focusing on base number of attacks. Instead,
future research could focus on other quantifiable measures such as amount of damage done,
number of casualties, and other measures of the ‘quality’ of terrorism.
It is also possible that negative emotions and attitudes are not being accurately captured. A
more direct measure of public emotional state which focuses less on policy issues and more on
satisfaction versus frustration and anger would possibly yield different results. The Public Mood
variable in particular leaves a big question as to how much ‘emotion’ is actually being measured
versus simply left/right leanings. Furthermore, the relationship between poverty, public mood,
and terrorism is the opposite of what is theoretically predicted. It of course makes sense when we
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step back and see that increases in poverty are associated with more liberal attitudes towards
government involvement in economics, including taxes and social welfare. It is likely that there
is very little in terms of emotion which is represented in this variable. Its predictive power may
in fact be reflecting political attitudes more closely associated with a US-specific type of
terrorism, specifically right-wing extremism. Essentially, when the mood is more conservative,
right-wing extremists are more likely to view the government as their enemy, while other
ideologies may not move to this line of thought. These same political cleavages are unlikely to
be predictive of terrorism in other cultures.
Based on this analysis, we can conclude that quick, dramatic changes in macro-economic
forces such as unemployment may produce the type of strain which may result in terrorism. This
is easily related back to both the broader strain theory literature, as well as the frustrationaggression and relative deprivation hypotheses. A sudden increase in unemployment can
potentially displace millions of workers who were previously well off. This change may be seen
as more unjust, and inflicted by powerful others, and more likely to increase feelings of fear,
anger, frustration, and resentment among the collective. These feelings are what Agnew (1992;
2010) argues influences people to turn to deviance and violence.
Poverty increases do not appear to result in terrorism, which is largely consistent with
other research evaluating this relationship (Piazza 2006). We can conjecture that poverty is not a
dramatic enough change to result in the types of strains which may cause terrorism. Poverty,
unlike unemployment tends to be more of a long-term state. It is absolute deprivation, and
objective strain, rather than relative deprivation and subjective strain which is associated more
with deviance, crime, rebellion, and terrorism (Gurr 1970, Agnew 1992, Agnew 2010).
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Ancillary analyses largely confirm the earlier conclusions of results and limitations. The
same Hypotheses were supported, and made stronger with the removal of Public Mood and
Poverty, two variables with clear problems in the previous analyses. What this shows is that
poverty is not likely a root cause of terrorism in the United States, while unemployment may be.
This makes sense when we think about the concepts: poverty is a much more static phenomenon,
and individuals typically experience poverty as part of a life course. Poverty is much more of a
social reality than unemployment, which represents a dynamic change in socio-economic status
and creates much more turmoil in the social environment.
One more interesting point can be conjectured from the descriptive statistics alone, that the
overall trend in terrorist incidents has been downward since the 1980s. This is similar to all
violent crime in the US. According to the GTD the past decade has been comparatively low in
terms of number of terrorist incidents. This leaves us with another question, of whether this trend
is the result of post 9/11 policies being effective at deterring violence, part of broader trends of
decreasing violence in the United States, or the result of some other, unmeasured factors. It is
possible that law enforcement and intelligence agencies have gotten better at stopping terrorist
plots before they come to fruition, therefore lowering the count of incidents. It is also possible
that the ‘quality’ of terrorist tactics has improved, so that instead of many ‘low quality’ attacks, a
group only needs one or two ‘high quality’ attacks in order to accomplish their goals. This would
also lower the overall number of incidents. In addition, looking to the broader criminology
literature may provide more possible explanations which could help explain this long-term trend.
The results of this study are not strong enough to definitively confirm or refute the principles
of General Stain Theory of Terrorism, and should be taken for what they are: a limited test of
part of a larger theoretical framework. What we can say from this analysis is that economic
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strains are likely one of many factors which influence terrorism in the United States, and that
increasing negative emotions is only one possible path which can lead us there. At the end of the
day, this study is not about material gain or macroeconomics, but rather how individuals and
groups deal with strain and stressors. This very may well be the case with a more rigorous
analysis, or it could be headed in the wrong direction. One thing is certain though, more testing is
needed before this theoretical approach can be accepted or refuted.
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Appendix A – Terrorist Groups

Included Groups
American Indian Movement
Americans for a Competent Federal Judicial
System
Americans for Justice
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
Animal Rights Activists
Anti-Abortion Activists
Anti-Environmentalist
Anti-Government Group
Armed Revolutionary Independence
Movement (MIRA) (suspected)
Army of God
Aryan Nation
Black American Moslems
Black Brigade (United States)
Black Liberation Army
Black Muslims
Black Panthers
Boricua Revolutionary Front
Chicano Liberation Front
Chicano Radicals (suspected)
Christian Liberation Army (suspected)
Coalition to Save the Preserves (CSP)
(suspected)
Condor
Continental Revolutionary Army
Covenant, Sword and the Arm of the Lord
(CSA)
Earth First!
Earth Liberation Front (ELF)
Earth Liberation Front (ELF),Revenge of the
Trees
Earth Night Action Group
East Side Action Committee
Environmental Life Force

Excluded Groups
Al-Qa`ida
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Anti Shah of Iran
Anti-Castro Command
Anti-Castro Group
Arabs (suspected)
Armenian Group
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of
Armenia
Armenians
Black September
Cali Narcotics Cartel
Croatian Freedom Fighters
Croatian Liberation Army
Croatian Nationalists
Cuban Action
Cuban C-4 Movement
Cuban Exiles
Cuban Secret Army
Cypriot
Hanafi Muslims
Imperial Iranian Patriotic Organization
Iranians (suspected)
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Islamist Extremists
Jamaat-al-Fuqra
Justice Commandos for the Armenian
Genocide
Kahane Chai (suspected)
Latin America Anti-Communist Army
(LAACA)
Lebanese Man
Libyan Students
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Environmentalist
Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International
Conspiracy (EMETIC)
Farm Animal Revenge Militia (FARM)
Fourth Reich Skinheads
Fred Hampton Unit of the People's Forces
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional
(FALN)
Gay Liberation Front
George Jackson Brigade
Independent Armed Revolutionary
Commandos (CRIA)
Individual
International Committee Against Nazism
(suspected),Jewish Action Movement
(suspected)
Jewish Armed Resistance
Jewish Committee of Concern
Jewish Defenders (suspected)
Jewish Defense League (JDL)
Jewish Direct Action (suspected)
Jewish Extremists
Ku Klux Klan
Left-Wing Militants
May 19 Communist Order
Mormon Extremist
National Socialist Liberation Front

Neo-Nazi Group
New Jewish Defense League
New World Liberation Front (NWLF)
Nuclear Liberation Front (suspected)
Organization 544
Peoples' Brigade For A Healthy Genetic Future
People's Liberation Army (United States)
Phineas Priesthood
Posse Comitatus
Puerto Rican Armed Resistance

Luis Boitel Commandos
Maccabee Squad and the Shield of David
Macoute sympathizers
Medellin Drug Cartel
Mexican Revolutionary Movement
Movement for Cuban Justice (Pragmatistas)
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)
National Front for the Liberation of Cuba
(FLNC)
National Integration Front (FIN)
Ninth of June Organzation
Omega-7

Organization Alliance of Cuban Intransigence
Otpor
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
(suspected)
Palestinians
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP)
Revolutionary Commandos of the People
(CRP)
Secret Cuban Government
Serbian Nationalists
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)
Tontons Macoutes
Vietnamese Organization to Exterminate
Communists and Restore the Nation
(suspected)
Vietnamese Refugees
Worldwide Organization of Native Taiwanese
Young Cuba
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Puerto Rican Nationalists (suspected)
Puerto Rican Revolutionary Movement
Red Guerilla Family
Republic of New Afrika
Republic of Texas
Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade
Save Our Israel Land
Secret Army Organization
Secret Organization Zero
Sons of the Gestapo
Student Radicals
The Jewish Execution with Silence
The Justice Department
The Order (Silent Brotherhood)
The Order II (Bruder Schweigen Strike Force II)
The Scorpion
Thunder of Zion
Tribal Thumb
United Freedom Front (UFF)
United Jewish Underground
Universal Proutist Revolutionary Federation
Unknown
Up the IRS, Inc
Weather Underground, Weathermen
White Extremists
Youths of the Star
Zebra killers
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Appendix B – Dataset

Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Terror
46
35
54
112
94
98
49
41
37
34
46
30
49
29
26
22
14
23
19
18
24
.
38
45
33
35
20
39
22
33
13
29
8
16
5
9
9

Unemployment Poverty
5.6
11.9
4.9
11.1
5.6
11.2
8.5
12.3
7.7
11.8
7.1
11.6
6.1
11.4
5.9
11.7
7.2
13
7.6
14
9.7
15
9.6
15.2
7.5
14.4
7.2
14
7
13.6
6.2
13.4
5.5
13
5.3
12.8
5.6
13.5
6.9
14.2
7.5
14.8
6.9
15.1
6.1
14.5
5.6
13.8
5.4
13.7
4.9
13.3
4.5
12.7
4.2
11.9
4
11.3
4.7
11.7
5.8
12.1
6
12.5
5.5
12.7
5.1
12.6
4.6
12.3
4.6
12.5
5.8
13.2

Public Mood
62.357
58.153
58.138
56.805
57.159
55.417
54.864
53.07
52.978
51.888
52.796
54.425
56.575
56.755
59.937
59.114
60.69
60.455
58.848
59.473
60.698
61.72
58.326
59.652
58.064
59.198
57.518
57.187
56.638
56.513
58.969
63.991
63.357
63.738
62.403
62.592
63.387

Most Important Problem
24.1135
38.6482
56.3478
59.6859
55.5344
45.3159
59.9662
50.7661
56.3124
69.208
78.7798
61.2119
52.7975
44.8276
37.4468
31.3726
33
23.4375
32.2539
40.1276
50.5342
46.0902
22.4404
29.7101
31.6416
21.2364
16.8942
11.4541
13.814
21.9932
25.1848
33.5164
27.6278
19.2051
15.1111
13.587
39.7258
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2009
2010
2011

1
7
7

9.3
9.6
8.9

14.3
15.1
15

66.854
66.543
66.035

52.6982
48.0118
53.2516

